Seems like everyone is writing about encryption and backdoors this season. “Policy Approaches to the Encryption Debate,” R Street Policy Study #133, by Charles Duan, Arthur Rizer, Zach Graves and Mike Godwin. “Encryption Policy in Democratic Regimes,” East West Institute. I recently blogged about the new National Academies report on the same topic. Here’s a … Read More “Two New Papers on the Encryption Debate” »
Category: backdoors
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Matthew Green wrote a fascinating blog post about the NSA’s efforts to increase the amount of random data exposed in the TLS protocol, and how it interacts with the NSA’s backdoor into the DUAL_EC_PRNG random number generator to weaken TLS. Powered by WPeMatico
The German Interior Minister is preparing a bill that allows the government to mandate backdoors in encryption. No details about how likely this is to pass. I am skeptical. Powered by WPeMatico
Both the New York Times and the Washington Post are reporting that Israel has penetrated Kaspersky’s network and detected the Russian operation. From the New York Times: Israeli intelligence officers informed the NSA that, in the course of their Kaspersky hack, they uncovered evidence that Russian government hackers were using Kaspersky’s access to aggressively scan … Read More “More on Kaspersky and the Stolen NSA Attack Tools” »
The ISO has decided not to approve two NSA-designed block encryption algorithms: Speck and Simon. It’s because the NSA is not trusted to put security ahead of surveillance: A number of them voiced their distrust in emails to one another, seen by Reuters, and in written comments that are part of the process. The suspicions … Read More “ISO Rejects NSA Encryption Algorithms” »
New research: “Verified Correctness and Security of mbedTLS HMAC-DRBG,” by Katherine Q. Ye, Matthew Green, Naphat Sanguansin, Lennart Beringer, Adam Petcher, and Andrew W. Appel. Abstract: We have formalized the functional specification of HMAC-DRBG (NIST 800-90A), and we have proved its cryptographic security — that its output is pseudorandom — using a hybrid game-based proof. … Read More “Proof that HMAC-DRBG has No Back Doors” »
Policy essay: “Encryption Substitutes,” by Andrew Keane Woods: In this short essay, I make a few simple assumptions that bear mentioning at the outset. First, I assume that governments have good and legitimate reasons for getting access to personal data. These include things like controlling crime, fighting terrorism, and regulating territorial borders. Second, I assume … Read More “Alternatives to Government-Mandated Encryption Backdoors” »
The US Senate just approved Signal for staff use. Signal is a secure messaging app with no backdoor, and no large corporate owner who can be pressured to install a backdoor. Susan Landau comments. Maybe I’m being optimistic, but I think we just won the Crypto War. A very important part of the US government … Read More “The US Senate Is Using Signal” »
Interesting law journal article: “Encryption and the Press Clause,” by D. Victoria Barantetsky. Abstract: Almost twenty years ago, a hostile debate over whether government could regulate encryption — later named the Crypto Wars — seized the country. At the center of this debate stirred one simple question: is encryption protected speech? This issue touched all … Read More “Encryption Policy and Freedom of the Press” »
The Linux encryption app Cryptkeeper has a rather stunning security bug: the single-character decryption key “p” decrypts everything: The flawed version is in Debian 9 (Stretch), currently in testing, but not in Debian 8 (Jessie). The bug appears to be a result of a bad interaction with the encfs encrypted filesystem’s command line interface: Cryptkeeper … Read More “Cryptkeeper Bug” »